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death statute to spell out that parental suffering may be considered
and that majority is not a cut-off line for damage recovery would allow
more adequate awards. In addition, legislative action removing the
dependency requirement is needed. The recent amendment to the
child-death statute is a step in the direction of curing multiple ills in
the entire wrongful death situation-but only that.

REGULATION OF TREATY INDIAN FISHING
On December 26, 1854, the Treaty of Medicine Creek' was concluded
between the United States2 and nine western Washington Indian
tribes. 3 The Indians ceded to the United States all rights in a large
portion of their tribal lands,4 but reserved the "right of taking fish, at
all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ...in common with all
citizens of the Territory."5 Whatever the representatives of the United
States or the Indian chiefs meant by this clause has been lost in antiquity. It is certain that they could not have foreseen the acrimony'
an inference that such recovery is not contemplated by the statute. While the general provision for "fair and just" awards avoids implication from the concurrent
specific enumeration of some elements (see note 79 supra), it might still be suggested that if the legislature intended to contradict a long-standing common law
rule it would have done so explicitly. (See note 73 supra.)
Moreover, it is not certain that the Washington court would reconsider its restrictive construction of what is contemplated by a "fair and just" award. (See
Penoza v. Northern Pac. R.R., 215 Fed. 200 (W.D. Wash. 1914), discussed note 51,
supra.)
'Treaty with Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132.
'Acting for the United States was Isaac I. Stevens, Governor of Washington
Territory.
'The Indian tribes signing the treaty were the Nisqually, Puyallup, Steilacoom,
Squak sin, S'iltomamish, Steh-chass, T'Peeksin, Squi-aitl, and Sa-heh-wamish.
'The Indians ceded approximately 2,240,000 acres and reserved reservations comprising 3840 acres. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, AN UNcom,
tO,"
CONTROVERSY 23 (1967).
The Indians received from the government $35,750, or
about 1.6 cents per acre.
'Treaty with Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, art. III.
'The Indians' claims to the right to fish free of state regulation have been
countered by the demands of commercial and sport fishermen that the Indians' fishing
be subjected to state regulation. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 170 and S.J. Res. 171
Before Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), especially app.,
at 211-29. The claims of the Indians have become something of a civil rights
cause celebre, with Dick Gregory and Marion Brando participating in "fish-ins"
protesting state regulation of treaty Indian fishing. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE
COMMITTEE, AN UNcOMNIMON CONTROVERSY 109-13 (1967). The latter reference contains an excellent, though not wholly unbiased, account of the entire controversy
over state regulation of treaty Indian off-reservation fishing. It concentrates primarily on the Puyallup, Nisqually, and Muckelshoot tribes, and delves deeply into
the historical and sociological aspects of the controversy, while placing a lesser emphasis on the legal issues.
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or the legal battles7 that it would cause many years later when the
Indians, in circumstances vastly changed from 1854, would invoke it
demanding the right to fish free of state regulation. It is equally
certain that the Indians could not have conceived that one hundred
years later over a million people would populate the Puget Sound
Basin,8 or that fishing would be an important contributor to the economy of those million people.' They also could not have conceived that
many of the salmon which their descendants now claim the right to
catch unrestrictedly would be hatched and released at state hatcheries"0
operated under a state conservation program.
Appellants in the principal case were members of the Puyallup
Tribe," one of the signatories to the Treaty of Medicine Creek.
Claiming immunity from state conservation regulations, the Indians
persisted in fishing at their "usual and accustomed grounds" in violation of state regulations' 2 forbidding commercial net fishing in rivers
of the state. The Washington State Departments of Game and Fisheries brought a declaratory judgment action 3 to determine whether
'The legal controversy over this clause, or ones very similar in other treaties,
has enveloped the state courts of Idaho and Washington, the Court of Claims, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
State v. Arthur 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953); State v. McCoy, 63 Wn. 2d 421,
387 P.2d 942 (1963); Makah Indian Tribe v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 701
(1960); Maison v. Confederated Tribes of.the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314
F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
'The population of the Seattle metropolitan area in 1960 was 1,107,213. 1966
WORLD ALMANAC 381.
'The average catch value of the Washington state commercial salmon catch for
the years 1963-64 was $8,769,000. The average processed value was $15,473,000, and
the average retail value was $21,856,000. AMERIcAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, AN
UNcoMMOsN CONTROVERSY table 4 (1967). The value of commercial fishing vessels and
gear in 1956 was estimated at $31,408,698. WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF FISHERIES.
FISHERIES, 203 (1960). The value of the salmon sport fishery is not capable of precise
measurement. However, in 1963 approximately 1,130,000 salmon were caught by the
1,467,000 salmon fishermen in the state. 73 WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
FISHERIES
ANN. REP. 43 (1963).
"0 There are two fish hatcheries located on tributaries of the Puyallup River.
One hatchery is operated by the Department of Fisheries and the other by the
Department of Game. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Department of Game v. The
Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 241, 422 P.2d 754 (1967).
" The Puyallups are a tribe of approximately 340 members, according to the
testimony given by a member of the tribe at congressional hearings. Hearings on
Si. Res. 170 and S.. Res. 171 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 119 (1964). See also, AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,
AN UNCOMMOoN CONTROVERSY 58 (1967).
2
See Brief for Respondent at 4, 5 supra note 10. See generally Wash. Admin.
Code, tit. 220, chs 20-48.
" The Indians objected to the state's bringing of a declaratory judgment action
instead of proceeding individually against the Indians in criminal actions. The
reason for their objection was the differing burden of proof. In both types of
actions, however, the issue as to the extent of Indian treaty rights is the same.
The court dismissed the objection stating that a multiplicity of arrests was un-

IVAStINGTON LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43 : 639

the Indians enjoyed immunity from state fishery regulation. The trial
court held that members of the tribe had no treaty rights and therefore no immunity. It permanently enjoined the Indians from fishing
in any manner contrary to state law. On appeal, a divided Washington
Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Held: Treaty Indians do
possess treaty off-reservation rights to fish at "usual and accustomed
grounds," but such fishing is subject to state fishing laws reasonable
and necessary to preserve the fishery. Department of Game v. The
Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 241, 422 P.2d 754 (1967),
cert. granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Dec. 19, 1967).
Rejecting the state's contention that the Indian treaty was not
viable, 4 a majority of the court'* stated that a treaty entered into
by the federal government could not be repudiated by the state. Hownecessary to determine whether the Indians have immunity from certain state conservation regulations.
" The state claimed that because the Indians, at the time of the signing of the
treaty, had only aboriginal, and not legal, title to the ceded land, they therefore
gave no consideration for the promises of the United States. The Indians, however, in the treaty pledged their dependence on the United States, promised "to be
friendly with all citizens thereof," and promised not to make war with other
tribes. Treaty with Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, art VIII. These promises could easily serve as consideration. Also, as the court in the principal case
pointed out, if the treaty were thought desirable by the United States, and entered
into by it, it is binding on the state, whether in actuality it was necessary or not.
" In addition to the majority's opinion there were two dissenting opinions and
one opinion partly concurring and partly dissenting. One dissent expressing the
views of three judges, argued that the trial court's injunction was proper because
the state's power to regulate fishing applied to Indians equally with other citizens.
The argument also stressed that all the state's conservation laws and regulations
are necessary for fisheries preservation, and that, under the holding of the majority,
state laws when necessary apply to treaty Indian fishing. Therefore, the trial court's
injunction was consistent with the majority's holding and should have been affirmed. The argument is erroneous. As to legislative enactments, there is no requirement that they be appropriate or necessary, Olson v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236
(1941), so long as they do not violate a specific federal constitutional prohibition
or a valid federal law. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). As to state
administrative regulations, the State Game commission is empowered to promulgate
"reasonable rules and regulations governing the time, place and manner, or prohibiting the taking of... game fish...". WASH. REV. CODE § 77.12.040 (1955). There
is no requirement that such regulations be necessary for the preservation of the
fisheries.
The holding of the court was that the state law, as applied to treaty Indian fishing,
must be necessary. A conservation law might be necessary to preserve a fishery
against depredations by the general public; but at the same time, it might be
wholly unnecessary to apply the law to the fishing of a few treaty Indians in order
to preserve a fishery.
One of the dissenters in a separate opinion stated that the treaty was merely
designed to prevent discrimination against the Indians and did not reserve them
any rights not shared by others.
Finally one judge concurred in the holding that the Indians do possess treaty
rights, but stated that, because the rights were granted by the federal government,
treaty Indian fishing cannot be regulated by the state to any extent. He also argued
that if the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations governing Indian off-reservation fishing rights, as he had indicated that he planned to do, 30 Fed. Reg. 8969
(1965), the state would be preempted from regulating treaty Indian fishing.
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ever, the court reasoned that the rights of the treaty Indians 6 did
not extend to the right to fish in such a manner as to destroy the
fishery because the state has the sovereign power to prevent destruction of a natural resource within its borders. The court concluded
that the state may properly impose on the treaty Indians reasonable
regulations necessary to the preservation of the fishery."
The court further stated that when treaty rights and conservation
laws are in "apparent conflict", a state law is valid if it is necessary
to conserve the fishery. This reasoning is unnecessarily complex.
Treaties, including Indian treaties, are the supreme law of the land."8
Conflict between treaty rights and state law must be resolved in favor
of the former. The conceptualization of a conflict is unnecessary,
however, to the court's resolution of the case. If fishing by treaty
Indians is inherently subject to state conservation laws necessary for
the preservation of the fishery, as the court held, then such laws do
not conflict with the Indians' treaty rights. 9 The issue before the
court was the extent of the immunity from fisheries regulation enjoyed
by a treaty Indian.
The permissible extent of state regulation of treaty Indian offreservation fishing is not clear. Until 1942, it was considered settled
that the Indians had reserved no rights which afforded them immunity
from state fishing regulations, but only easements over state and
"This note does not consider issues raised by the question: Who is a treaty
Indian?
"'The court remanded the case so that the trial court's injunction which had
enjoined the Indians from fishing in violation of state laws, could be conformed to
the court's holding. The court stated that specific acts should be enjoined on the
basis that there has been a violation of a statute or regulation shown to be reasonable and necessary for the preservation of the fishery. One member of the court
felt the state had failed to show that it was necessary that treaty Indian fishing be
subject to the conservation laws involved. The majority, however, felt the state had
clearly shown that continued net fishing by the Indians would destroy the fishery.
"s See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832); Holden v. Joy, 17 Wall. 211
(1872). In 1871, Congress decreed:
That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United
States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or
power with whom the United States may contract by treaty: Provided, further,
that nothing herein contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the
obligations of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such
Indian nation or tribe.
25 U.S.C. 71. Post-1871 agreements with the Indians, unlike the Treaty of Medicine
Creek, are not treaties in the constitutional sense.
"Q
It is difficult to understand why the court used such a statement. The state in
its brief correctly resolved the matter by stating, "Once the quantum of rights
granted by a treaty is defined, a state is powerless to further restrict or to amplify
the 'right' as constitutionally defined." Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 62.
The court had ample legal basis for holding that the state has the power to regulate Indian fishing in order to preserve the fishery. See note 33 infra.
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private property to enable them to fish.2 ° Then the Supreme Court held
in Tulee v. Washington2 1 that a state could not require treaty Indians
fishing at their usual grounds to purchase fishing licenses. State22 and
lower federal courts23 have interpreted Tulee as indicating, contrary to
earlier decisions, 24 that Indian off-reservation fishing is not completely
subject to state conservation regulations. 2 ' Disagreement exists as to
the scope of the immunity.
Further complicating the controversy are federal regulations recently promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior purporting to
govern the exercise of the treaty Indians' off-reservation fishing
rights. 2' This note will first determine the proper extent of state
regulation of treaty Indian off-reservation fishing and then ascertain
the effect of the federal regulations on the state's attempts to govern
this fishing.
Four rules have been employed to determine the permissible extent
of state regulation. These rules can be characterized as (1) the
absolute rule, (2) the indispensable rule, (3) the reasonable rule,
and (4) the necessary rule. All except the reasonable rule have been
derived from Tulee. The reasonable rule has its origin in the case
of Kennedy v. Becker.
The United States Supreme Court has
granted certiorari in the principal case. 28 Because it may well base
its decision on one of these rules, it is necessary to examine and evaluate them to determine which offers the best resolution of the overriding question as well as this particular controversy.
Derived from the Supremacy Clause, 9 the absolute rule prohibits
the state from regulating treaty Indian fishing. Those who favor the
rule argue that the treaty must be construed as the Indians understood
oSee, e.g., Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916) ; State v. Towessnute 89 Wash.
478, 154 P. 805 (1916); cf. State v. Wallahee, 143 Wash. 117, 255 P. 94 (1927);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1904).
-1315 U.S. 681 (1942).
2See,
e.g., State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953) ; State v. Satiacum,
50 Wn. 2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957).
' See, e.g., Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation,
314 F.2d 169, (9th Cir. 1963); Makah Indian Tribe v. Schoettler, 192 F.2d 224,
(9th Cir. 1951).
'See
note 20 supra.
'The court in Tilee stated that the licensing statute was invalid because "it
acts upon the Indians as a charge for exercising the very right their ancestors intended to reserve." The statute did not charge the Indians for exercise of a right to
an easement, but for exercise of a right to fish. Tulee resolved the question of
whether the Indians reserved a treaty right to fish, but did not answer the question
of the extent of Indian fishing immunity from state regulation.
-32 Fed. Reg. 10434 (1967).
241 U.S. 556 (1916).
36 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Dec. 19, 1967).
'See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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it,30 assuming that in 1854 the Indians understood the treaty to reserve
the absolute right to fish in any manner and at any time."' The evidence supporting this interpretation is far from conclusive. 2 It neither
proves nor disproves that the Indians in 1854 understood the treaty
to reserve to them an absolute right to fish at their usual places.33
Such questionable evidence must be balanced against policy arguments in favor of the state's power to preserve the existence of its
fisheries.34 Because spawning salmon are concentrated within a com'This principle of construction has been accepted by the United States Supreme
Court as a correct one. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384 (1904) wherein
the Court stated, "We will construe a treaty with the Indians as 'that unlettered
people' understood it..." See also Seuffert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194
(1918). But see Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916).
'See State v. Satiacum, 50 Wn. 2d 513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957): cf. State v. Arthur
74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953).
'In State v. Arthur, the court's only evidence as to the Indian's understanding
of the treaty was an account of the proceedings of the council where the treaty was
signed. This document, however, proves very little as to the Indians actual understanding. See State v. Arthur, 74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135, 140 (1953). In State v.
Satiacum the court mustered no evidence whatever as to the Indian's understanding
complete immunity from state law. See State v. Satiacum, 50 Wn. 2d 513, 523, 314
P.2d 400, 410, (1957). The minutes of the council where the Treaty of Medicine Creek
was signed also give no indication of what the Indians understood the treaty to reserve to them as regards off-reservation fishing rights. The sole reference to Indian
fishing rights in the minutes is as follows:
It was also thought necessary to allow them (the Indians) to fish at all accustomed places, since this would not in any manner, interfere with the rights of
citizens, and was thought necessary for the Indians to obtain a subsistence.
U.S. DEP'T OF INTIUOR, OFFIcE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, FIsHING, HUNTING AND RELATED RIGHTS OF CERTAIN INDIAN TRIBES IN WASHINGTON AND OREGON 330 (1942).
The minutes give no hint as to whether the Indians regarded their off-reservation
fishing rights as absolute, or whether they understood their off-reservation fishing
to be subject, to some extent, to state regulation.
' The Supreme Court has also indicated that perhaps the Indians' understanding
of the treaty is irrelevant in determining the scope of their reserved fishing rights.
[I]t can hardly be supposed that the thought of the Indians was concerned with
the necessary exercise of inherent power under modern conditions for the
preservation of wild life. But the existence of the sovereignty of the State was
well understood, and this conception involved all that was necessarily implied
in that sovereignty, whether fully appreciated or not.
Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 563 (1915). This case involved the interpretation of a treaty concluded in 1797 between the Seneca Indians and Robert Morris
and ratified by the United States. The treaty reserved to the Indians the right to
fish on the ceded land. The Court held the Indian fishing to be subject, however, to
state conservation laws.
"As to the existence of this power see: Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896);
Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D.Md.), aff'd per curiam 355 U.S. (1957). State
v. McCoy, 63 Wn. 2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963); Frach v. Schoettler, 46 Wn. 2d 281,
280 P.2d 1038, cert. denied 350 U.S. 838 (1955).
The theory that the state "owns" the fish and wildlife within its borders in
trust for its citizens and hehce may arbitrarily discriminate against non-citizens
has been largely rejected. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947); Takahashi
v. Fish & Game Comm. 334 U.S. 410 (1947). These cases, however, do not deny the
state's power to preserve its natural resources. They only require that the power be
exercised in a non-discriminatory manner. "The whole ownership theory, in fact, is
now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance
to its people that a state have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an
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paratively small area, even a few treaty Indians, unrestrictedly fishing
with modern gill nets or with set drift nets extending the entire width
of a river, could effectively decimate a run. A certain number of
fish must get up the river to the spawning beds in order to perpetuate
the species.3 " The absolute rule leaves the Indians free to destroy the
fishery at will, without evidence that this result was intended by any
of the signers of the treaty."
The indispensable rule is less restrictive of state regulation than the
absolute rule. Courts following the indispensable rule37 have held that,
for a state regulation to be validly applied to the treaty Indians' fishing, the state must show the regulation is indispensable in the sense
that the fishery cannot be preserved by more stringent regulation of
non-treaty Indian fishing. Such regulation would include, if necessary,
complete curtailment of fishing by those not having treaty rights.3
Analytically the indispensable rule is unsound. The rule is derived
from dictum in Tulee: "
important natural resource." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 (1947).
' See State v. McCoy, 63 Wn. 2d 421, 387 P.2d 942, 946 (1963).
' The absolute rule has been adopted by only one court. See State v. Arthur
74 Idaho 251, 261 P.2d 135 (1953). The decision in State v. Satiacum, 50 Wn. 2d
513, 314 P.2d 400 (1957) was by an evenly divided court so the rule was not
actually adopted. See Addendum to the decision, 50 Wn. 2d at 538. The rule has no
basis in prior United States Supreme Court cases, and recent dictum indicates that
the Court is not favorably inclined toward it. See Egan v. Organized Village of
Kake, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
' The rule has been adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See
Maison v. Confederated Tribe of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169
(9th Cir. 1963).
In the Maison case, the Indians brought a declaratory judgment action seeking
to enjoin the Oregon State Game Commission from enforcing regulations prohibiting fishing on tributaries of the Columbia and Snake Rivers during part of the
year against treaty Indians fishing at their usual grounds. The Indians contended
that this state restriction on their fishing violated their rights guaranteed under a
treaty very similar to the Treaty of Medicine Creek.
The court stated that "restriction of the fishing of Indians is justifiable only if
necessary conservation cannot be accomplished by a restriction of the fishing of
others." There was no necessity of restricting Indian fishing to preserve the resource because the state had not shown that exclusion of sports fishermen from the
spawning grounds would not accomplish the same result. Therefore, the regulations
were not "indispensable" and could not be applied to treaty Indian fishing.
'See Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314
F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963). The court stated that "the complete exclusion of sports
fishermen from the spawning grounds as an alternative does not amount to arbitrary
discrimination against them, because the state possesses broader power to regulate
sports fishing than it does to regulate fishing by the Indians." However, the same
analysis could apply to commercial fishing in Puget Sound because commercial
fishermen are no less subject to state regulation than sports fishermen. A vital
question under the indispensable rule would be the definition of "spawning ground."
If "spawning grounds" include all of Puget Sound, because the salmon when they
enter the Sound are on their way to spawn, then the rule could preclude all commercial fishing.
" Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942).
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The license fees prescribed are regulatory as well as revenue producing.
But it is clear that their regulatory purpose could be accomplished otherwise, that the imposition of license fees is not indispensable to the effectiveness of a state conservation program.
The Court thus stated that before the licensing statute, which was
both revenue producing and regulatory, can apply to treaty Indian
fishing it must be shown to be "indispensable" to the effectiveness of
a state conservation program. Tulee does not support the proposition
that before a purely regulatory statute can apply to Indian fishing
the statute must be shown to be indispensable.
The indispensable rule is also unsound for reasons of policy. The
rule correctly premises that the state has the inherent power to prevent
a fishery from being destroyed by treaty Indian fishing,4" but the rule
reduces that power to a nullity. The state does not conserve fisheries
for the sake of conservation. The state instead seeks the benefits of
intelligent management. These benefits include commercial and recreational fishing, fisheries related industries, and tourism.4 '
Under the indispensable rule if a fishery is endangered, all commercial and recreational fishing by non-treaty Indians must be prohibited
before treaty Indian fishing can be regulated.42 By the time the state
may validly exercise its power, all the benefits which it seeks to derive
from such exercise are lost. The indispensable rule thus allows a state
power to regulate treaty Indian fishing, but so limits the power as to
render it vacuous.43
A third rule defining the permissible extent of state regulation of
treaty Indian off-reservation fishing is the reasonable rule. Under
this rule, treaty Indian fishing is subjected to all reasonable state conservation laws. The only requirement of the rule is that the law be
0

" See note 33, supra.
' See note 9, supra.
The Indians could easily by unregulated fishing endanger the fishery. The
state would then have to curtail all non-Indian fishing on the stream and perhaps
near its mouth. The Indians could then allow just enough escapement of salmon
to perpetuate the run. Since the fishery would not then be endangered the state could
not regulate the Indians' fishing, but at the same time could not permit anyone else
to fish, because this added fishing would place the fishery in danger.
"The state would be in effect preserving the fishery for the benefit of the Indians.
Whether the state would consider the exercise of its power of preservation worthwhile in such a situation is questionable. Certainly it might consider relocating
the two fish hatcheries now located on the Puyallup if all non-treaty Indians were
excluded from fishing the stream. The court in the principle case specifically rejected the indispensable rule as a "completely unworkable standard" which "would
make the competent exercise of the state's inherent power of preservation an impossibility."
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reasonable. Although the rule has not been accepted since Tulee, it
nevertheless requires examination.
Advocates of the rule admit, as they must after the Supreme Court's
decision in Tulee44 that the Indians reserved not only an easement of
access to their usual fishing grounds, but also a right to fish on these
grounds. However, under the reasonable rule, these fishing rights are
merely a guarantee of review of state regulations for due process. The
treaty clause becomes a redundancy. The essence of the Indians'
reserved fishing rights is the degree of immunity which these rights
afford from state regulation. To say that Indian fishing is subject to
all state conservation laws is to say in effect that the Indians reserved
no treaty rights to fish. The reasonable rule obliterates any meaningful distinction between the Indians' fishing rights and those of other
citizens,4 although the Supreme Court has stated that the treaty
"conferred ...continuing rights, beyond those which other citizens
may enjoy, to fish at their 'usual and accustomed places'." 4"
7
The fourth rule is the necessary rule adopted in the principal case.1
The rule occupies a middle ground with the indispensable rule between
extremes of complete regulation and no regulation. It differs, however,
from the indispensable rule in that the state, in showing a particular
law to be necessary, need not prove that more stringent regulation of
non-treaty Indian fishing will not preserve the fishery. Close examination of the necessary rule reveals that it offers a better resolution of
the problem than do the three rules previously discussed.
Under the necessary rule, treaty Indian fishing is subject, as it is
under the indispensable and reasonable rules, to the state's inherent
power to preserve a fishery. The necessary rule, however, allows
judicial review of fisheries regulations concerning Indians. The test
for review is more severe than legislative reasonableness. The rule
requires the state, before regulating treaty Indian fishing, to show
25 supra.
"The only difference between the two sets of rights, under the reasonable rule,
is that the treaty Indians do not have to purchase a fishing license to exercise
their rights to fish at the "usual and accustomed grounds." Once the non-Indian has
purchased a license, then the two sets of rights to fish become equal.
" Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684 (1942).
The rule is derived from a dictum in Tulee wherein the Court stated that "the
treaty leaves the state free to impose on the Indians all laws of a purely regulatory
nature... necessary for the conservation of fish." This statement is supportive of
the rule. Had the Court wanted to allow the state to impose all regulatory conservation laws on the Indians' fishing, the word "necessary" was wholly superflous.
Taking the statement at its face value, the Court must have meant that the state may
impose on the Indians' fishing only those laws which are indeed necessary for the
conservation of fish.
"' See note
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48
that the regulations are necessary to preserve the particular fishery.
This continuing judicial review on the federal question of the necessity
of regulation amply protects the Indians' treaty rights to fish from
derogation by the state.
The Indian fishing rights, under the necessary rule, are not reduced
to a meaningless fiction, as they are under the reasonable rule. Their
fishing is immune from state conservation laws which, as applied to
treaty Indian fishing, are not necessary for the preservation of the
fishery.4 9
Nor does the necessary rule curtail the state in the exercise of its
power of preservation, as does the absolute rule. The state need only
show that the regulation in question is necessary, as regards treaty
Indian fishing, for the fishery's continued existence.50 If the state can
show this, it may validly enforce the regulation on treaty Indians.
Because the state need not limit all nontreaty Indian fishing to make
a showing of necessity, the state is able to maintain an effective conservation program 5' and to obtain the benefits which it seeks to obtain
from the exercise of its power to preserve the fisheries. The necessary
rule thus allows the Indians the exercise of a meaningful treaty right
to fish, and at the same time allows the state effective exercise of its
"Because it is through its power of preservation that the state is able to regulate treaty Indian fishing, see Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556 (1916); State v.
McCoy, 63 Wn. 2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963); Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963), the state ought to b2
required to show the necessity of the exercise of the power. Otherwise, the state,
by simply invoking its power, could regulate treaty Indian fishing to whatever extent itwished.
"Indians would probably be forbidden under the necessary rule from violating
state regulations forbidding commercial net fishing in state rivers. Two hundred Indians fishing commercially with modern gill nets could easily catch enough fish to endanger a salmon run. See State v. McCoy, 63 Wn. 2d 421, 387 P.2d 942 (1963).
However, they would probably be allowed, under the rule, unrestricted subsistence
fishing with hook and line, since it is unlikely that treaty Indians, fishing purely
for subsistence, would endanger a fishery. See Judge Hill's concurrence in State
v. McCoy: "[R]ights of the Indians to fish by the methods and with the gear in use
at the time of the treaty cannot be suspended or abridged." Judge Hill, writing
for the majority in the principal case, may incorporate this position in the ,zecessary rule.
' This is not an impossible burden of proof. In the principal case the state
introduced index counts from the Puyallup River, research data of the Department
of Fisheries, and testimony of fisheries experts to show the effect of Indian fishing
and the necessity of the state regulations. The court held that the state had clearly
established that a regulation prohibiting the use of drift and set nets was necessary
for the preservation of the fishery. For a case where the state failed to carry the
burden of proving necessity see State v. James, 72 Wash. Dec. 2d 738, 435 P.2d 521
(1967).
"' The Supreme Court in Tidee indicated that a state must be allowed to maintain an effective conservation program. A statute which is both revenue producing
and regulatory may be applied to treaty Indian fishing if such statute is "indispensable to the effectiveness of a state conservation program."
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power to preserve the fisheries. Of the four rules it is the only one
which reaches an equitable balance between the Indians' treaty rights
to fish and the State's interest in preserving its fisheries.
It is possible, however, that the principal case may not be decided
by determination of the permissible extent of state regulation of treaty
Indian fishing. It will undoubtedly be argued before the Supreme
Court that federal regulations recently promulgated by the Secretary
of the Interior which purport to govern the exercise of treaty Indian
off-reservation fishing rights have preempted state regulation . 2 It is
necessary to ascertain whether these regulations do preempt the state
from regulating fishing by the treaty Indians on their "usual and
accustomed ground."
The Secretary of the Interior does not have a "general power to
make rules governing Indian conduct.""3 He does enjoy, however, a
sort of general supervisory power over Indians. But this power is
"simply a power to take administrative measures necessary for the
execution of responsibilities and authorities otherwise more definitely
fixed by statute or treaty.""4 The statutes granting this general supervisory power to take administrative measures "cannot be relied upon
as grants of new power unrelated to the statutory responsibilities of
the Department.""5 These statutes cannot be relied upon as authoriz-

Shortly after the principal case had been decided, the Secretary promulgated
the regulations. 32 Fed. Reg. 10433 (1967). The regulations were published on
July 10, effective either 30 or 60 days thereafter, depending upon the section invol ved.
'Organized
Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 63 (1962); F. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 100-03 (1945).
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 54 (1958).
In Organized Village of Kake
T% Egan, the Court held that there was "no statutory authority under which the
Secretary of the Interior might permit (the Indians) to operate fish traps contrary
to state law." In this case there was no treaty involved, and the Secretary was relying for his power on general statutes which the Court said did not confer "a general
power to make rules governing Indian conduct."
In Metlakatla Indian Community v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, (1962), the Court stated
Inhat
a statutory provision subjecting the Indians' reservation to regulations of the
Secretary of the Interior was "unusual," and that no other "treaties or statutes which
have come to our attention contained such a provision."
" Use of Allotted Indian Lands, 58 Interior Dec. 103, at 107 (1942).
'Id. These general statutes can be found at 25 U.S.C. §2 (1964), 25 U.S.C. §9
(1964); and 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1964). For an analysis of the powers which they confer
on the Secretary, see 58 Interior Dec. at 106-107, 109. "(A)ctions which this
Department purported to justify on the basis of 'general supervisory powers' have
been repeatedly condemned by the Federal courts as unauthorized and unlawful."
58 Interior Dec., at 109. According to correspondence with George D. Dysart, Assistant Regional Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, the regulations were issued
under the above statutory authority. See Letter from George D. Dysart to lashington
Law Review, Feb. 12, 1968, on file in U'ashington Law Review office.
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ing the regulations in the instant case because the Treaty of Medicine
Creek fixed no power in the Secretary to regulate treaty Indian fishing."0 Congress has not subsequently conferred that power. 57 The Deparment of Interior itself has specifically disclaimed such authority in
the past. 8 Although Congress has the power to authorize the Secretary
to promulgate regulations governing the exercise of the Indians' treaty
fishing rights, it must be concluded in the absence of such authorization"0 that the regulations are void and can not preempt the state.00
The Secretary's power to regulate is derived solely from the treaty,
' Treaty with Nisquallys, Dec. 26, 1854, 10 Stat. 1132, art. III. The treaty is
completely silent as to action to be taken by the Secretary or the President as
regards the treaty fishing of the Indians. This is in contrast to many other treaties
where, when it was thought necessary, power was conferred on the President or the
Secretary to make regulations. See e.g., Treaty with Menomonies, Feb. 8, 1831,
7 Stat. 342; Treaty with the Arapahoe and Cheyenne, Feb. 18, 1861, 12 Stat. 1163;
Treaty with Poncas, Mar. 12, 1858, 12 Stat. 997.
' See Hearings on S.J. Res. 170 and S... Res. 171 Before the Subcomm. on Indian
Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1964). S.J. Res. 171 would have authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to extinguish the Indians' treaty rights by compensation. In
the resolution it was stated:
Whereas Congress could by legislation resolve the issues either (1) by prescribing the kind of regulation that may be imposed on the exercise of these
treaty rights.., or (2) by providing for ... payment of compensation therefore....
From this it might be inferred that the drafters of the resolution considered it
necessary for Congress to authorize the Secretary to issue regulations governing
the exercise of the Indians' treaty rights. S.J. Res. 170 would have authorized
the states to enforce laws of a purely regulatory nature on the Indians' fishing.
Neither of the two bills passed, nor have any bills dealing with the problem been
since introduced.
'In testimony given before the hearings on the Senate Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs in 1964, a representative of the Department of the Interior stated that
without specific congressional authorization the Secretary would have no authority
to regulate the exercise of treaty Indian fishing rights either on or off the reservation. This authority, it was stated, lay with the tribes. The Puyallup Tribe has
itself enacted regulations governing the exercise of the Indians' treaty fishing
rights. See Hearings on S.1. Res. 170 and 171, supra note 56, at 15-16, 120-21.
Obviously the Secretary now believes that he does have authority to issue the
regulations without specific congressional authorization. Admittedly, there are in
a few cases dicta which might support such a broad scope of authority. See United
States v. Birdsall. 233 U.S. 223, (1914); United States ex rel. West v. Hitchcock,
205 U.S. 80 (1907). "But it will be found that in each case where such language
appears there is some specific statutory authorization for departmental action,"
58 Interior Dec. at 109, and the general power of the Secretary is invoked only to fill
in "gaps of detail." In the treaty in the principal case, there is no authorization "for
departmental action," let alone "gaps of detail." The treaty in Articles IV, V, and VI
does provide for action by the President in removing the Indians to their reservations,
in disbursing funds to the Indians, and in allotting to individual Indians land on the
reservation. As to these directives, there may be authorization for the President or the
Secretary to fill in "gaps of detail." But in Article III, regarding the Indians' reserved
right to fish, the treaty is wholly silent as to any administrative action to be taken.
See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL LAW 103 where it is stated:
The claim of administrative officers to plenary power to regulate Indian conduct has been rejected in every decided case where such power was not invoked
simply to implement the administration of some more specific statutory or
treaty provision.
wSee note 57 supra. During this period of congressional silence, it was generally
believed that without authorization by Congress the secretary would not regulate.
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as he has no congressional authority to impair the Indians' rights
under the treaty. The regulations themselves state that nothing in
them shall be deemed to abrogate or modify the Indians' treaty rights.
If the federal regulations are held by the Supreme Court to preempt
state regulation, their scope cannot exceed that of valid state regulations. Regardless of who has authority to regulate their fishing, the
scope of the Indians' immunity from governmental regulation is
defined by the rule which the particular court, state or federal, has
previously used in interpreting the treaty. If the adjudication to
enforce the federal regulations is brought in state court, the necessary
rule will be followed. If it is brought in federal court, the indispensable
rule will be followed. When federal officials enforce federal regulations, it is likely that the adjudication will take place in federal court,
where the indispensalle rule is followed." t But adherence to this rule
is not warranted by precedent, logic, or policy.6 2 Hence, the Court,
before it validates the federal regulations ought to examine closely
to determine whether the Secretary has exceeded his powers in promulgating them.
As a matter of policy, this conclusion is even more warranted. The
conservation of fisheries vitally concerns the state both in its own right
and as parens patriae. The state, not the federal government, has
developed a comprehensive conservation program and the expertise
necessary to administer it. Recognizing this, Congress has historically
left the regulation of fisheries to the state."
See Hearings on S.J. Res. 170 and 171, supra note 56, at 15-16; cf. 58 Interior
Dec., at 107-09. A reasonable inference from the accepted interpretation and Congressional inaction is that Congress did not intend such fishing to be so regulated.
'The amicus brief of the United States submitted to the United States Supreme
Court in the principal case assumes the validity of the regulations without discussion.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, The Puyallup Tribe v. Department of
Game of the State of Washington, 70 Wash. Dec. 2d 241, 422 P.2d 754 (1967), cert.
granted, 36 U.S.L.W. 3255 (U.S. Dec. 19, 1967). The regulations at the present time
only call for identification of fishing equipment, for the issuance of identification cards
to Indians listed on a tribal roll approved by the Secretary, and prescribe the procedure for the promulgation of further regulations. The Secretary has authority to
promulgate a tribal roll for the purpose of distributing tribal funds, 25 U.S.C. § 163
(1964), but in the absence of express legislation to the contrary an Indian tribe has
authority to determine for tribal purposes its own membership. UNITED STATES
DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 414 (1958).
"See Maison v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314
F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1963).
'See p. 677, supra.
"See Royce & Hansen, Food Fishery Policies in the Western United States.
43 WAsH. L. REv. 231, 237 (1967). The federal government's role has been largely
that of aiding state development of fisheries through research and subsidy. See
Anadromous Fish Act of 1965, 16 U.S.C. § 757a (1965), wherein Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into cooperative agreements with one
or more states for the purpose of conserving and developing anadromous fish re-
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A final point mitigating against preemption should be made. Under
treaties with Canada and Japan,64 the United States has the responsibility of carrying out "necessary conservation measures" 5 with regard
to salmon originating in rivers of this country. 6 To effectuate this
responsibility the federal government has relied upon state fisheries
management and regulation. The state's interest, therefore, is the
federal interest. Preemption of the state regulations by the Secretary's
regulations, and the consequent adherence to the indispensable rule,
would, by hamstringing the state, seriously prejudice the United
States in carrying out its treaty responsibilities in the North Pacific.
In such a situation as this, courts should be wary of holding that
federal regulations of doubtful utility promulgated without a clear
congressional mandate preempt state regulations. State regulatory
interests in fisheries are intense, and the only contrary federal interest
is that of protecting Indian rights. Administrative regulations so
tenuously grounded as these should not preempt the state.

sources. See also the Commercial Fisheries Research and Development Act, 16
U.S.C. §79 (1964), wherein the Secretary is authorized to cooperate with the
States through their state agencies in carrying out projects designed for research
and development of commercial fisheries resources. The Act makes federal grants
available to the states upon approval of a development plan by the Secretary.
National fisheries policy has been aptly summarized thusly: "National action
should be reserved for residual participation where State and local governments are
not fully adequate, and for continuing responsibilities which only the National
Government can undertake" U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, TRIDENT-A LONG RANGE
REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF COMMERCIAL FIsHERIES 31 (1963).
' International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786; Convention for the Protection,
Preservation and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River
System, May 26, 1930, 50 Stat. 1355, T.S. No. 918.
' International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific
Ocean, supra note 63, art. V, § 2. See generally, NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES SYMPosIum, 43 WASH. L. REv. 1-307 (1967)).
' These treaties cannot, of course, be regarded as a source of power for the Secretary to regulate the Indians' fishing. They contain no mention of how the United
States' responsibility to conserve the fisheries is to be effectuated. Congressional
inaction in the face of state implementation should be regarded as approval of such
implementation.

